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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3317 
___________ 
 
KARINA ROBREDO,           
  Appellant 
 
v. 
 
METRO HONDA 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-15-cv-08135) 
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2017 
Before:  RESTREPO, SCIRICA and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 26, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
PER CURIAM 
 Karina Robredo appeals pro se from the District Court’s entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Metro Honda.  We will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
2 
 
Robredo was involved with two transactions with Metro Honda—a 2009 
installment agreement for the purchase of a 2006 Honda CR-V, and a 2010 agreement for 
the lease of a 2010 Honda CR-V.  She believed that Metro Honda had engaged in 
fraudulent and deceptive sales practices in those transactions and brought suit in New 
Jersey state court.  On the basis of arbitration clauses in the two agreements with Metro 
Honda that Robredo had signed, the New Jersey Superior Court dismissed her complaint 
and compelled her to engage in binding arbitration with Metro Honda.   
Robredo was represented by counsel in the arbitration of the dispute, which the 
parties settled.  Robredo then contested the settlement and won the right to pursue a 
second arbitration, this time proceeding pro se.  The arbitrator in the second case 
concluded that Robredo’s claims had no merit, and denied Metro Honda’s counterclaims 
for fees and costs.   
Eleven months after the arbitrator issued the award, Robredo sued Metro Honda in 
the District Court, bringing substantially the same cause of action but also invoking 
various federal statutes.  Metro Honda moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction, on res judicata grounds, and as untimely filed under the applicable 
statutes of limitations.  Metro Honda acknowledged that its motion referred to matters 
outside of the pleadings and might, accordingly, have to be considered in the alternative 
as a motion for summary judgment.  After Robredo responded to the motion, the District 
Court granted summary judgment in favor of Metro Honda.  This appeal followed. 
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 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s order granting summary judgment.  DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 
267 (3d Cir. 2004).  We construe Robredo’s pro se pleadings liberally.  See Haines v. 
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam).  We may affirm the District Court’s 
judgment on any ground that the record supports.  See Hughes v. Long, 242 F.3d 121, 
122 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 Here, there was no genuine issue of material fact that Robredo was not entitled to 
relief on the claims that she brought in her federal lawsuit because she had already agreed 
to litigate all such claims in arbitration.  In particular, the parties agreed to arbitrate all 
claims that might arise out of, or would be related to, the automobile transactions—
including all state, federal, or statutory claims.  The agreement included non-exclusive 
examples of such claims: “Consumer Fraud, Used Car Lemon Law, and Truth-in-
Lending claims.”  The parties agreed to waive their rights to pursue other remedies in 
other forums, including in court.  The parties also agreed that the arbitration decision 
would bind them.  After Robredo brought suit in state court, the New Jersey Superior 
Court ruled definitively that her suit was subject to arbitration. 
 On appeal, Robredo argues that the arbitration proceedings were somehow unfair 
or one-sided, but the record does not bear out that assertion.  In those proceedings, the 
parties had the opportunity to present and rebut evidence to support their legal claims.  
Robredo provided both pre-hearing and post-hearing submissions to the arbitrator before 
a final decision issued, and Robredo herself testified at the hearing.  The proceedings then 
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concluded when the arbitrator issued a reasoned opinion in December 2014.  Robredo 
never appealed that decision to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New 
Jersey, nor sought to vacate or modify the award within the prescribed period to do so.  
See 9 U.S.C. § 12 (“Notice of a motion to vacate, modify, or correct an award must be 
served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed 
or delivered.”).  Robredo’s contention that the District Court could hear her claims in 
federal court because the arbitration proceedings were somehow unfair or biased 
therefore has no support in the record.1 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Metro Honda’s 
motion to summarily affirm is dismissed as moot. 
                                              
1 In addition, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Robredo’s claims were 
time-barred—an issue that Robredo did not address on appeal in her briefs.  Also, 
although the parties did not discuss tolling in their briefing, no basis for equitable tolling 
of the statutes of limitations is apparent in the record. 
